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I. INTRODUCTION

Spa packages, resort trips, and five million dollar bonuses. No, these
are not grand prizes on Wheel of Fortune. Instead, these are a few fringe benefits and other compensation schemes awarded to American International Group
(AIG) executives between 2007 and October 2008.2 In fact, just days after AIG
received $37.8 billion in federal loan assistance through the financial bailout of
2008,3 its executives enjoyed spa treatment at the St. Regis resort in California.
A year earlier, former AIG CEO Martin Sullivan had "urg[ed] AIG's board of
directors to waive pay guidelines to win a $5 million bonus for 2007--even as
the company lost $5 billion in the 4th quarter of that year."5 Those losses and
Sullivan's compensation controversy were only a preview of AIG's ability to
anger America. By mid-March of 2009, blood-pressures were sky-rocketing as
AIG announced that, after receiving bailout funds totaling nearly $170 billion, it
would pay top level executives $165 million cumulatively.6 Such pay grades,
especially in the wake of an undeniably failed business strategy, moved the topic of executive compensation, which has long been a back-burner topic in American politics, to the forefront of a raging political discussion.
Executive compensation levels have undeniably been on the rise in
America, even while some corporations' profits, like AIG's, 7 have faltered.8 In
fact, "[i]n 1965, the average American chief executive officer was paid about
twenty-four times as much as the average worker; in 2007, the multiple was two
hundred and seventy-five."9 Such imbalances have led some to believe that
I

Wheel of Fortune is a popular television program in which contestants complete word
phrases by spinning a wheel and selecting letters. The wheel often contains bonus prizes, trips,
and other luxury items.
2
Associated Press, White House CallsAIG Spa Trip 'Despicable', MSNBC.CoM, Oct. 2008,
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27086714/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
3
See Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) Information, infra note 28.
4
Associated Press, supra note 2. "The resort tab included $23,380 worth of spa treatments for
AIG employees," and the entire retreat cost $440,000. Id. That figure included other activities,
such as banquets and golf outings. Id. The sum of AIG's bailout money later rose to a grand total
of approximately $170 billion. Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, A.I. G. PlanningHuge BonusMar. 14, 2009, available at
es After $170 Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/ 03/15/business/15AIG.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
s
Associated Press, supra note 2 (emphasis added).
6
Andrews & Baker, supra note 4.
7
See id.
8
Larry Bumgardner, High CEO Pay Could Draw Renewed Attention in Election Year,
Issue
2,
(2008),
available at
BusINEss
REVIEW,
Vol.
11,
GRAZIADIO
http://gbr.pepperdine.edu/082/ceopay.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
9
David Owen, The Pay Problem; What's to be done about C.E.O. compensation?,THE NEW
YORKER, Oct. 12, 2009.
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America's present executive compensation levels are incommensurate with its
current executive performance, thereby creating an injustice to shareholders.'o
Although the topic of executive compensation regulation has been on the table
since 2006, it gained widespread attention during the 2008 presidential campaign."
Today, many Americans 2 believe that the Constitution protects freedom
of contract; however, such belief may be ill-founded in a post-Lochner'3 world.
This Note will examine that question, specifically in the context of government
regulation of executive compensation. Although the Note will tangentially mention the constitutionality of regulating pay for those executives at companies
receiving TARP funds, the Note will focus on the constitutionality of regulating
non-TARP executive compensation, as implemented by the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).14
This Note is divided into two sections. First, it will trace the history of
the executive compensation regulation movement in America, as well as contemporary attitudes and beliefs about the constitutionality of regulating executive compensation. Second, the Note will examine the constitutionality of executive compensation regulation, both as provided for by the law and contemplated in political discourse, as it relates to the law under: the Taxing and
Spending Clause;" the Commerce Clause 6 and its relationship with the Tenth
Amendment;' 7 Due Process, including economic substantive due process; the
Contracts Clause;' 8 and the Takings Clause19 . The Note will specifically ex10 See Lorraine Rothenberg & Todd S. McCafferty, 'Say on Pay': Linking Executive Pay to
Performance,
LAW.COM,
Sept.
24,
2008,
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202424735938 (last visited Dec. 29, 2009). As
Sen. Obama noted, "[i]t's about changing a system where bad behavior is rewarded so that we can
hold CEOs accountable, and make sure they're acting in a way that's good for their company,
good for our economy, and good for America, not just good for themselves." Stephen Taub,
Obama Pushes Say on Pay, CFO.COM, Apr. 11, 2008, http://www.cfo.com/ article.cfm/1 1037327
(last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
"
Bumgardner, supra note 8.
12
Or at least a good number, judging by an influx of cyberspace chatter following Kenneth
Feinberg's announcement of the executive compensation caps. Feinberg was appointed to the
position of Special Master for executive compensation at companies who received Troubled Asset
Relief Funds (TARP).
'
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in which the Court held that a statute limiting
bakers' weekly work hours violated a constitutionally protected freedom of contract, was expressly overruled by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
14
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376, 1899, 111th Cong. (July 21, 2010).
1s
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
16
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
"
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
18
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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amine the constitutionality of the Dodd-Frank Act,2 0 and find it, as well as other
possible regulatory avenues not yet formally proposed to the legislature, constitutional. Ultimately, this Note will conclude that, barring the Court's deviation
from stare decisis, the Dodd-Frank Act, 2 1 as well as other proposed executive
compensation limitations, should pass constitutional muster: Americans may
have many rights, but the unqualified right to determine compensation structures
is not one of them.
II.

FROM SAY-ON-PAY TO REGULATION-NO-WAY: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION REGULATION THEORIES AND ATTITUDES IN
AMERICA

Prior to the 2008 presidential election, proponents of executive compensation regulation touted "say-on-pay" as the modem key to controlling allegedly
out of control compensation structures. 2 2 "The 'say-on-pay' movement results
from the perception by activist shareholders that executive compensation is excessive."23 In 2007, both the House and Senate introduced identical legislation
called the Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act. 24 In 2008, Senator Barack Obama (D-Ill.), who sponsored the Senate's 2007 Shareholder Vote
on Executive Compensation Act, 25 endorsed "say-on-pay" legislation that would
have required "corporations to have a nonbinding vote on executive pay." 26
When Senator Obama ran against Senator John McCain (R-Az.) in the 2008
presidential election, "say-on-pay" once again received widespread recognition,
support, and criticism,27 especially in the wake of the government bailout for
financial institutions, automobile manufacturers, and other companies that were
"too big to fail."28

20
21

Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.
d

Rothenberg & McCafferty, supra note 10.
23
Id.
24
Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, S. 1181, 110th Cong. (2007); Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. (2007).
25
Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, S. 1181, 110th Cong. (2007).
26
Taub, supra note 10.
27
Bumgardner, supra note 8. Sen. McCain also supported "say-on-pay" and first introduced
the concept to his supporters during a speech in Arlington, Virginia, to the National Federation of
Independent Business. Coen, Andrew, McCainjoins Obama on 'say on pay'policy, INVESTMENff
NEWS, Jun. 11, 2008; see also Rothenberg & McCafferty, supranote 10.
28
TARP was announced on October 18, 2008, as a collection of programs designed to "strengthen market stability, improve the strength of financial institutions, and enhance market liquidity."
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) Information, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE
SYs., Apr. 21, 2010, http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/tarpinfo.htm (last visited Mar. 8,
2011). "Too big to fail" became a term in common parlance following the TARP bailout.
22
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Following the initial Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) bailout, 29
Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass.) proposed to the House of Representatives the Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of
2009.30 The bill, co-sponsored by eleven representatives, was essentially a new
version of "say-on-pay" legislation." On December 9, 2009, the bill stalled in
committee in the House. However, one week earlier Rep. Frank introduced
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,33 which officially became law on July 21, 2010.34
The Dodd-FrankWall Street Reform and Consumer ProtectionAct

a.

The purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act is, in part, "[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency
in the financial system, to end 'too big to fail,' to protect the American taxpayer
by ending bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from abusive financial services
practices .

. .

.

In its final form, the legislation amends the Securities and

Exchange Act of 193436 to provide for greater disclosure of executive compensation to shareholders, 37 including shareholder approval of certain types of compensation, and it establishes independent compensation committees to oversee
the propriety of executive compensation awards.38 For example, at least once
every three years, shareholders shall receive an opportunity to vote on executive
compensation, along with other shareholder proposals.39 Shareholders will also
vote to approve or deny golden parachute provisions in compensation packages. 40
Although the Dodd-Frank Act primarily focuses on protecting the United States economy, generally, its emphasis on shareholder input underscores a
See id.
Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 3269, 111th
Cong. (as introduced to House, July 21, 2009). Rep. Frank's bill is officially titled: "To amend
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to provide shareholders with an advisory vote on executive compensation and to prevent perverse incentives in the compensation practices of financial
institutions." Id.
29
30

31

Id.

See H.R. Rep. No. 111-367, pt. 1 (2009).
H.R.
4173,
THOMAS,
Major
Actions,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?dl 1l:HRO4173:@@@RITOM:/bss/dl 1 lquery.htmll (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
34
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1899, 111th Cong. (July 21, 2010).
3
Id.
32
33

38

15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (2009).
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1899, § 951.
Id. § 952.

3

Id. § 951 (amending Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a)).

*

Id.

36
37

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2011

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 113, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 8
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

936

[Vol. 113

secondary purpose of the Act: providing corporate owners-shareholderswith increased control of their investments. The largest group of shareholders"now close to two-thirds" of all stockholders-are "institutions such as mutual
funds, pension funds, and employee stock-ownership plans."41 According to
Nell Minow, co-founder of The Corporate Library, 42 "the nation's pension
plans, collectively, 'represent hundreds of billions of investment dollars and
many millions of shareholders . . . ",4 Consequently, not only are many individuals' retirements at stake, but the delicate balance between social security
funds and pension plans hinges on the stability of the national markets. The
Dodd-Frank Act's express goal of financial stability is thus furthered by its protection of shareholders' personal assets.
In addition to increasing federal oversight of institutions' disclosures
about executive compensation, the Dodd-Frank Act actually prescribes regulations that would prohibit certain types of executive compensation." Specifically, the law states that:
.

Not later than 9 months after the date of enactment of this title,
the appropriate Federal regulators shall jointly prescribe regulations or guidelines that prohibit any types of incentive-based
payment arrangement, or any feature of such arrangement, that
the regulators determine encourages inappropriate risks by covered financial institutions - (1) by providing an executive officer, employee, director, or principal shareholder of the covered
financial institution with excessive compensation, fees, or benefits; or (2) that could lead to material financial loss to the covered financial institution.4 5
Under the current law, regulators will determine whether or not to prohibit certain types of compensation based on the standards as set forth in the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act.46 Nonetheless, certain previously-permitted methods of
compensation are certain to be prohibited soon-at least for covered financial
institutions. 47

41
42

Owen, supra note 9.
Id.

43

Id.

45

Id. § 956 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 2, 1831 pl).
Id. § 956(b).
Id.

4

47
Covered financial institutions, for purposes of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act include:
(A) a depository institution or depository institution holding company, as such
terms are defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12
U.S.C. § 1813);
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The Corporateand FinancialInstitutionCompensationFairnessAct of
2009

Although the Dodd-Frank Act imposes sweeping change and, more notably, very public limitations on executive compensation, the legislation is in fact
tame relative to its now-defunct relative, the Corporate and Financial Institution
Compensation Fairness Act of 2009.48 Beyond the present provisions, that 2009
legislation proposed to allow regulators to regulate and directly influence certain
executives' compensation. 49 For example, the Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009 had "[d]irect[ed] the SEC to direct the
national securities exchanges and national securities associations to prohibit the
listing of any class of equity security of an issuer that does not comply with speIn other words, failcified requirements for compensation committees ....
ure to follow the rules would have resulted in corporations' inability to trade
stocks.
In an even more drastic provision, Frank's original proposed legislation
had decreed that:
appropriate Federal regulators jointly shall prescribe regulations
to require each covered financial institution to disclose to the
appropriate Federal regulator the structures of the incentive(B) a broker-dealer registered under section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 780);
(C) a credit union, as described in section 19(b)(1)A)(iv) of the Federal Reserve Act;
(D) an investment advisor, as such term is defined in section 202(a)(1 1) of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(l 1));
(E) the Federal National Mortgage Association;
(F) the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation; and
(G) any other financial institution that the appropriate Federal regulators,
jointly, by rule, determine should be treated as a covered financial institution for purposes of this section.
Id. § 956(e)(2). Importantly, no covered financial institution with assets less than $1,000,000,000
is subject to the Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, subtitle E, thereby exempting small banks,
commonly referred to as community banks, which comprise ninety-one percent of the banking
industry. Id. § 956(f); Community Banking Facts, INDEP. COMMUNITY BANKERS OF AM., Dec. 31,
2009, available at http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/cbfacts.pdf (last visited Mar. 8,
2011).
48
See supra text accompanying note 30.
49
See supra text accompanying note 30. Previously, Congress attempted to regulate executive
compensation through limiting tax deductions available to executives, implementing stringent
disclosure requirements, and prohibiting executive loans. Ira T. Kay & Steven Van Putten, Executive Pay: Regulation vs. Market Competition, 619 POL'Y ANALYSIS 1, 11 (2008).
50
H.R. 3269 (as introduced to House, July 21, 2009).
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based compensation arrangements for officers and employees of
such institution sufficient to determine whether the compensation structure (1) is aligned with sound risk management; (2) is
structured to account for the time horizon of risks; and (3)
meets such other criteria as the appropriate Federal regulators
jointly may determine to be appropriate to reduce unreasonable
incentives for officers and employees to take undue risks that (i)
could threaten the safety and soundness of covered financial institutions; or (ii) could have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability.5
In a departure from the Dodd-Frank Act's more moderate direction that
regulators adhere to already-established Federal Deposit Insurance Act standards, 52 Frank's original proposed legislation incorporated these overtly subjective regulator guidelines. Ultimately, regulators would have had the power to
prohibit any compensation scheme that they deem to threaten financial institutions or the economy in general. For better or worse, many of the more extreme provisions in Rep. Frank's original bill were omitted from the Act that
bears his name.
Preceding the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act's passage in July 2010,53 the topic of executive compensation regulation was a newsworthy topic. In June 2009, the Obama administration appointed Kenneth Feinberg as a special master for executive compensation at
companies receiving TARP funds.54 In October 2009, one of Feinberg's first
official decisions was to cap executive pay at companies and other institutions
that received government aid through TARP. 5 Altogether, Feinberg's plan
called for "drastic pay cuts for 136 top executives at the nation's biggest bailedout companies . . . .56 Generally, executives' salaries were reduced approximately ninety percent and "Feinberg demanded that each of the bailed-out
companies reduce total compensation for their top 25 highest-paid employee[s]
by 50%, on average."57 In December 2009, at the same time Frank introduced
s
52

H.R. 3269, § 4(a)(1) (as introduced to the House, July 21, 2009).
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1899, § 956(b).

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376, 111th Cong. (July 21, 2010).
54
Matthew Jaffe, Obama's New Special Master: Don't Call Him 'Pay Czar,' ABC NEWS,
Jun. 11, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=7815620 (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
5
David Ellis, Washington's bank pay crackdown, CNNMONEY.CoM, Oct. 22, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com /2009/10/22/news/companies/compensation white house/ index.htm (last
visited Mar. 8, 2011).
56
Id
5

Id.; see Jaffe, supra note 54. In addition to negative salary adjustments, "[t]he pay restrictions for all seven [affected] companies will require any executive seeking more than $25,000 in
special benefits-things such as country club memberships, private planes and company cars-to
get permission for those perks from the government." Associated Press, Pay Czar Feinberg,Not
5
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the bill that became law,58 Feinberg decided to slash pay for mid-level executives at companies and institutions that received TARP funds. 59
Since the Dodd-Frank Act passed, executive compensation remains a
visible topic. In September 2010, the Center on Executive Compensation submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission its proposal for how to implement the regulations provided for in the Dodd-Frank Act.60 On November 1,
2010, PricewaterhouseCoopers released its 2009 Board of Directors' Survey, in
which "75% of respondents believe[d] executive compensation should be left to
the board of directors." 6 1 The survey, submitted to 10,000 United States corporate directors on April 14, 2009,62 was administered during the heart of the economic woes faced by corporate America. Despite the Dodd-Frank Act's subsequent passage, current discussion, as evidenced the PricewaterhouseCoopers
survey and national media, demonstrates that while the law may have changed,
corporate attitudes and the public's perception of them may not change overnight.
In the aftermath of Feinberg's compensation cuts for executives at companies that received TARP funds, several legal theorists weighed-in on the constitutionality of his conduct. Professor Michael W. McConnell concluded that
Feinberg's office as special master for compensation, and therefore all decrees
promulgated from that office, are unconstitutional for violating the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. 63 Andrew Napolitano6 likewise believed that
Obama, Behind Decision to Slash Executive Pay, FoxNEWS.COM, Oct. 22, 2009,
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/10/22/pay-czar-feinberg-obama-decision-slash-executivepay/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
58
Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.
5
Eamon Javers, 'Pay Czar' Kenneth Feinberg caps pay of midlevel executives. POLITICO,
Dec. 11, 2009 http://www.politico.com /news/stories/1209/30480.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
6
Letter from Center on Executive Compensation to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, U.S.
Securities
and
Exchange
Commission,
Sept.
1,
2010,
http://www.execcomp.org/docs/COEC%20PreComments%20on%2OExec%2Comp%20in%2OTi
tle%201X%2ODodd-Frank.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2011) (recommending that regulators permit
flexibility with the frequency of "say-on-pay" votes, allow change-in-control disclosures to be
disseminated with proxy information, and limiting the source data for and means of calculating
ay ratio disclosures).
PricewaterhouseCoopers, What Directors Think: 2009 Board of Directors Survey, at 8
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/corporate-governance/assets/what-directors-think-2009(2009),
report.pdf.
62
Id. at L.
63
Michael W. McConnell, Opinion, The Pay Czar is Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29,
2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703574604574499953
992328762.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2011). McConnell explains that pursuant to the Constitution,
article two, section two, all officers must be appointed by the president. Id.; see U.S. CONsT. art.
II, § 2. Moreover, McConnell explains that even if Feinberg is an inferior officer, he still required
a Congressional appointment. McConnell, The Pay Czar is Unconstitutional. Treasury Secretary
Timothy Geitner appointed Feinberg. Id.
6
Andrew Napolitano, Opinion,... They Violate Good Sense and the Constitution, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 6, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl23388405082355077.html (last
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the compensation limitations for executives at TARP institutions are unconstitutional, but for very different reasons. 65 Napolitano asserted that the government
"may not condition corporate welfare on the prohibition of contracts with employees above an arbitrary salary amount, because freedom of contract is protected by the Constitution as well."6 6 The average American, on the other hand,
may simply feel that the Dodd-Frank Act went too far, or did not go far enough,
based on vague notions of the U.S. Constitution derived from a distant civics or
political science education.
In fact, between the bailouts, corporate director pay cuts, and current reports of directors' confidence in what at least outwardly appeared to be corporate America's darkest hour, it is no wonder that many Americans are confused,
both with respect to what has actually happened and also with respect to the
boundaries within which the government can regulate or cap executive pay at
financial institutions and private corporations. The topic is hot, yet the information about the proper limits-Constitutional limits-of Congressional (and administrative) regulation of executive compensation is scarce. This Note isolates
and defines those boundaries and the constitutional justifications for them.

visited Mar. 8, 2011). Napolitano served as a judge on the Superior Court of New Jersey between
1987 and 1995. Id Importantly, this Note uses Judge Napolitano's argument simply as a tool to
succinctly explain the Constitutional position adopted and/or espoused by many, including laypeople and professionals, on the subject of executive compensation regulation. This author acknowledges that Judge Napolitano's argument appears to stem from his belief that the Constitution was violated when long before recent moves to regulate executive compensation. When
asked in a recent interview with The Daily Bell whether law and economics diverged when law
moved away from the common law, Judge Napolitano responded:
No ... when the government violated the Constitution by authorizing the states
to interfere with private contracts and then eventually interfering with private
contracts itself. I mean much of this was done under the Commerce Clause.
The Commerce Clause was written to keep commerce between the states
regular, not to enable Congress to regulate every aspect of the movement of
goods from one state to another.
Judge Andrew Napolitano on Chaotic Courts and 'Unconstitutional'Justice in the United States,
THE DAILY BELL, June 6, 2010, http://www.thedailybell.com/1 108/Judge-Andrew-Napolitano-onChaotic-Courts-and-Unconstitutional-Justice-in-the-United-States.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
This Note should not be construed as a criticism of Judge Napolitano; rather, it explores the points
raised in his opinion piece and uses them to explicate common misunderstandings under the body
of constitutional law generally accepted today.
65
Napolitano, supra note 64.
6
Id. Napolitano also attempts to argue that the salary caps constitute government takings in
violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. Id.
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III.
REGULATING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: FOUR AVENUES
AVAILABLE TO CONGRESS THROUGH THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

In 1913, Charles Austin Beard argued that the Constitution is a body of
law fundamentally concerned with property relations between individuals.6 7
Four primary areas of the Constitution govern Congress's ability to regulate
those property relations via contracts and the economy: the Taxing and Spending Clause6 8 ; the Commerce Clause6 9 and its relationship with the Tenth
Amendment 70; the Contracts Clause71; and Due Process, including substantive
economic due process and modern due process grounded in the Fifth 72 and Fourteenth73 Amendments. This section will explore the constitutionality of regulating executive compensation with respect to each governing clause in the Constitution and find that under each, regulations would pass constitutional muster.
Been There, Done That: The Taxing and Spending Clause as a Constitutional Means ofRegulating Executive Compensation

a.

The Taxing and Spending Clause 74 of the Constitution states that, "[t]he
Congress shall have the Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence [sic] and general
Welfare of the United states; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States[.]" 75 Although the scope of Congress's tax-

67

CHARLES AusTiN BEARD, AN EcoNoMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUnON OF THE

UNITED STATES 11-13 (1921), available at books.google.com. Interestingly, Professor Beard
adopted a "living constitution" approach to the Constitution's governance of property relations:
Insamuch as the primary object of a government ... is the making of the rules
which determine the property relations of members of society, the dominant
classes whose rights are thus to be determined must perforce obtain from the
government such rules as are consonant with the larger interests necessary to
the continuances of their economic processes, or they must themselves control
the organs of government. . . . The social structure by which one type of legislation is secured and another prevented-that is, the constitution-is a secondary or derivative feature arising from the nature of the economic groups
seeking positive action and negative restraint.

Id. at 13.
68
69

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.

70

U.S. CONST. amend. X.

71

74

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1

75

Id

72

n
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ing and spending powers was the subject of much debate, 6 Justice Roberts,
writing for the Court in United States v. Butler,n decided that "[w]hile ... the
power to tax is not unlimited, its confines are set in the clause which confers it,
and not in those of section 8 which bestow and define the legislative powers of
the Congress."78 In Butler, the Court confronted the constitutionality of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, which imposed processing taxes on certain local agricultural growers in an attempt to re-balance the supply and demand of certain agricultural commodities. 79 The Court rejected the United
States government's argument that such taxation fell within the general welfare
provision of article I, section 8, because the ends to which the tax would be put,
namely interfering with local markets, did not serve the general80 welfare.8 1 In
so doing, the Court limited the scope of Congress's power under the Taxing and
Spending Clause.
Later, they clarified Congress's Taxing and Spending Clause power in
South Dakota v. Dole, in which South Dakota challenged a federal statute that
required states to increase the minimum drinking age to twenty-one in order to
receive federal highway funding.82 Congress's rationale for thus conditioning
federal highway funds was based on its finding that disparate drinking ages between states encouraged those underage in one state to drive into another state
for the purpose of consuming alcohol and that this lead to increased incidences
of drinking and driving. In finding the statute constitutional, the Court noted
that "[i]ncident to this power, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of
federal funds, and has repeatedly employed the power 'to further broad policy
objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the
recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives."' 84 The Dole
Court articulated, however, that the conditions may not be ambiguous or coercive.85 Notably, the Dole criteria for conditioning spending or taxing applied to
states, not individuals or entities. 86 Ultimately, Dole teaches that Congress may
conditionally exercise its Taxing and Spending power to provide for the "generJames Madison believed the scope to extend only to the Congressional powers enumerated
in article one, section eight, whereas Alexander Hamilton believed the extent of the powers were
defined within the Taxing and Spending Clause's reference to the "general welfare." United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-67 (1936).
77
Id.
76

78

Id. at 66.

79

Id. at 53-54.

so

Meaning "national" within the case.
Butler, 297 U.S. at 77.
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
Id. at 208.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 211.
Id

81
82

8
8
85

86
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al welfare," as long as its reasons for doing so promote that welfare on a national basis.
Congress, via the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), has previously exercised its power to tax individuals for all compensation, including executive
87
compensation. At its most basic level, Congress has created the IRS, which in
However, many corporate executives receive
turn taxes personal income.
compensation other than cash wages.89 The IRS thus also regulates non-wage
executive compensation, including: stock options and transfers of those options
to relatives, non-qualified deferred compensation plans, salary deduction limitations,90 fringe benefits, and golden parachutes. 9 ' Despite the fact that many corporate executives would prefer not to pay taxes on these forms of compensation
and non-compliance is a problem recognized by the IRS,92 the constitutionality
of these percentage-based tax measures is relatively unquestioned.
Although the Taxing and Spending Clause is inapplicable to the executive compensation regulations of the Dodd-Frank Act 3 because the Act implements no taxes, its applicability to possible future executive compensation regulation like future percentage-based taxation 94 would not violate the Constitution.
Personal income tax has existed, and has been constitutionally accepted, since
the Civil War era; 9 5 non-wage compensation is merely part of a corporate executive's personal income and thus constitutionally subject to taxation.

87

IRS,

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION-FRINGE BENEFITS AUDIT TECHNIQUES GUIDE

(02-2005),

at
available
2010,
30,
Mar.
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=134943,00.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2011). According to the IRS, "[a]ny property or service that an executive receives in lieu of or in
addition to regular taxable wages is a fringe benefit that may be subject to taxation." Id.
88
I.R.C. § 61 (2006).
89
IRS, supra note 87.
90
Salary deduction limitations are governed by I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006). IRS, CORPORATE
at
available
2009,
1,
Oct.
COMPLIANCE,
EXECUTIVE
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=135045,00.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2011).
91
Id.
92

Id

9
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1899.
9
Because proposals for flat-tax models are numerous and diverse, this Note does not address
them in depth. To the extent that a flat tax could impose a cap on executive compensation, the
issue is addressed infra at Section Ill.b.iii. This Note does not conceive of a cap on executive
compensation as a tax, but instead as a regulation akin to minimum wage laws.
9

U.S.

DEP'T

OF

THE

TREASURY,

HISTORY-1800-1899,

available

at

http://www.treasury.gov/about/history/Pages/1 800-1899.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
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Commerce, as Governed Through the Commerce and Due Process
Clauses: A Divided View on the ConstitutionalityofRegulating Executive Pay96

The Commerce Clause, probably one of the best known methods by
which Congress can regulate the economy and private contracts, states that,
"The Congress shall have Power . . . [3] To regulate Commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes[.]"97 The
Courts have broadly interpreted Congress's Commerce Clause power to extend
to its channels, instrumentalities, and other activities substantially affecting interstate commerce.
Moreover, since the late 1930s, many challenges to the
government's regulation of commerce have come instead through challenges
under the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and
overtime, the Supreme Court has determined that economic regulations are subject only to a rational basis inquiry. Consequently, when joined, the Commerce
and Due Process Clauses mostly apply to the executive compensation regulations of the Dodd-Frank Act,99 as it is the Commerce Clause that has authorized
many of America's modem securities lawsoo and the Due Process Clauses that
have justified wage laws in America.' 0
i.

The Commerce Clause: A History of Limited Constitutional
Power

The Commerce Clause, or perhaps more accurately, Congress's approach toward commerce, has gone through four phases of application in American history, including a phase that did not truly rely on the Commerce Clause at
all-economic substantive due process.' 02 Although solidly rooted in the annals
of American jurisprudence, the third phase, often known as the "Lochner Era,"
nonetheless continues to tug at the sentiments of the American populous, as
evidenced by Judge Napolitano's response to executive compensation regulation. 0 3 Napolitano suggests that executive compensation caps are unconstituSection II.a.ii.2 actually addresses substantive economic due process, which relied on the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the case of reverse incorporation, the
Fifth Amendment, rather than the Commerce Clause. However, this clause was used during this
period of economic substantive due process as a means to define the scope of Congress's powers
over questions of commerce.
9
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
9
9
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1899.
'"
ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CoNsTrruTIONAL LAW 112 (2d ed. 2005).
10o West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 393-94 (1937).
102
CHEMERiNSKY, supra note 100, at 112-13. This Note will not discuss the first two eras; the
Note will elaborate on the third, often referred to as the "Lochner era."
103
Napolitano, supra note 64.
96
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tional because they violate "freedom of contract."'04 On the other hand, in his
law blog Professor Matthew Franck criticizes Napolitano's freedom of contract
theory, saying:
[flor about 40 years, from the 1890s to the 1930s, the Court protected (inconsistently, to be sure) something it called 'freedom
of contract,' but it was based on an illegitimate reading of the
due process clauses that was cut from the same 'substantive due
process' cloth that gave us the protection of slavery in the Dred
Scott case 05 and of abortion in Roe v. Wade. 0 6
Despite the case law in this area, confusion clearly abounds, even
among legal scholars. More confusing is Franck's historical outline, which can
only be fully appreciated after understanding the history of the Commerce
Clause. In pairing Dred Scott, which has been overruled, 10 7 with Roe v.
Wade, 08 which is still in force, Franck suggests that both were "cut from the
same 'substantive due process' cloth." 109 According to Franck's suggestion, it
seems that the Lochner "freedom of contract" interpretation of the Commerce
Clause, the Commerce Clause a la the DredScott era, and the modem interpretation of the Commerce Clause, as espoused in Roe v. Wade, must share at least
some similarities. The only sensible common denominator between the three is
"liberty" and it is precisely the Court's "substantive due process" treatment of
"liberty" that Franck seems to criticize. After all, through each era, the Court
has done one thing consistently: it has been forced to interpret and infer a
meaning of "liberty." It appears that therein lies Franck's criticism, which will
be clearer after an in-depth review of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In any
event, given the complexity of that jurisprudence, it is no surprise that confusion
abounds in this arena, even among the most accomplished of scholars.
1.

Commerce Clause Pre-1937

The truth requires a bit of backtracking to fully understand the legal
roots of Napolitano's (and the American public's) sentiments; only after one
understands the history will Franck's criticism make more sense. Beginning
'D Id.
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
1
Matthew J. Franck, Andrew Napolitano's Imaginary Constitution, NATIONAL REVIEW
http://bench.nationalreview.com/post/
(Feb.
6,
2009),
ONLINE
?q=NzBkZThjOGMzOGFmMTZjMWJINDE2NDdiMjMyMDBiNzQ=
(last visited Mar. 7,
2011).
107 DredScott, 60 U.S. 393, was superseded by constitutional amendment in 1868. Its overruling was first recognized by Oliver v. Donovan, 293 F. Supp. 958 (D.C.N.Y. 1868).
1os
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
105

109 Id.
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0 the Commerce Clause, including the Dormant Comwith Gibbons v. Ogden, 11
merce Clause,"' has posed basic questions about how to define commerce.112
After Gibbons, it was clear that "commerce" transcended state lines, but beyond
that, the contours of "commerce" remained murky. United States v. E.C. Knight
Co. began to define those contours by determining that "[c]ommerce succeeds
to manufacture, and is not a part of it." 13 Nearly forty years later, in 1936, just
before the dawn of a new era in Commerce Clause interpretation, the Court in
Carterv. CarterCoal Co. defined "commerce" as "the equivalent of the phrase
'intercourse for the purposes of trade,' and include[d] transportation, purchase,
sale, and exchange of commodities between the citizens of the different

states."'14

Through 1937 the Court held a very narrow view"s of what constituted
commerce. Until at least 1918, the Court viewed commerce subject to Congressional control as strictly the transportation of or dealings in goods between
states; aspects of commerce contained solely within one state were subject
strictly to that state's police power pursuant to the Tenth Amendment."' 6 Such a
limited view of Congress's power prevented many present-day labor protections, such as child labor laws." 7

22 U.S. 1 (1824).
II
The Dormant Commerce Clause is inferred from the Commerce Clause, and it gives Congress the ability to state and local activities that place an undue burden on interstate commerce.
For purposes of this Note, the Commerce Clause and Dormant Commerce Clause will be treated
as one and the same, since they derive from the same provision in the Constitution.
112
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 2 (establishing boundaries of interpretation for "commerce" and determining that commerce applies to navigation not wholly within one state).
113
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895), abrogated by United States v.
Ballinger, 312 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2002).
114
298 U.S. 238, 298 (1936).
115
Narrow, at least when compared with today's view.
116
See Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (the Shreveport
Rate Case, which found that Congress was entitled to regulate railway rates because the railway
was a means of interstate commerce and the rates affected the flow of commerce); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 543 (1935) (holding that "[t]he mere fact that
there may be a constant flow of commodities into a state does not mean that the flow continues
after the property has arrived and has become commingled with the mass of property within the
state and is there held solely for local disposition and use"); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 96 S.E. 62, 66 (W. Va. 1918) (distinguishing from the Shreveport Rate Case on grounds
that, although "the Interstate Commerce Commission would have jurisdiction to compel the granting of such facilities because of the interstate commerce offered [by the railway], but this fact
does not deprive the state of its right to see that shippers with freight of an intrastate character are
given the facilities to which they are entitled").
"
See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (holding that Congress overstepped its bounds in regulating the interstate
transportation of goods manufactured through the labor of children working more than eight hours
a day, six days a week, after 7 P.M., or before 6 A.M.).
1o
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Sidelining the Commerce Clause: Economic Substantive Due Process

The era between the late nineteenth century and 1937 sidelined the
Commerce Clause, as the Supreme Court grappled with economic substantive
due process, which considers the adequacy of a government's reasons for infringing upon one's life, liberty, or property."' 8 Although economic substantive
due process, as the name implies, focuses on the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution,'l 9 its application was so closely intertwined with the the Commerce Clause between the late nineteenth century and 1937 that a discussion of
the Commerce Clause during this era would be incomplete without the economic due process theory that worked with and shaped it.
Perhaps it was writing on the wall for this doomed due process theory
when its first appearance in the Supreme Court failed miserably. In the Slaughter-House Cases,12 0 Justice Miller, in delivering the Court's opinion, declared
that
it is sufficient to say that under no construction of that provision
[the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause] that we have ever
seen, or any that we deem admissible, can the restraint imposed
by the State of Louisiana upon the exercise of their trade by the
butchers of New Orleans be held to be a deprivation of property
within the meaning of that provision.121
With the Court's pronouncement in the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court
quashed economic substantive due process's first attempt to designate livelihoods as forms of property subject to due process considerations.12 2
Economic substantive due process was a resilient creature, though, 23
and in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,'24 the Court unquestionably used the formerlyrejected economic substantive due process for the first time to protect against
government regulations that interfered with and endangered freedom of con-

118

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 100, at 521.

11

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

120

83 U.S. 36 (1872).
Idat80-81.

121

§ 1.

Such considerations would have severely impaired the federal and state governments' ability to regulate working conditions, contracts, and many other aspects of business. See, e.g., id.
(challenged constitutionality of state law granting private company a monopoly on slaughtering
business for a fixed term).
123
Such resilience is evidenced, at least in part, by many Americans', including Judge Napolitano's, inability to recognize its inapplicability in modem American jurisprudence. See Napolianto, supranote 64.
124
165 U.S. 578 (1897).
122
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tract. 125 In Allgeyer, the Court adopted Justice Bradley's analysis of liberty,
found in his concurring opinion in the earlier-rejected Slaughter-House Case.12 6
Succinctly, Justice Bradley found that liberty includes "the liberty of pursuitthe right to follow any of the ordinary callings of life[.]"' 2 7 Using Justice Bradley's analysis, the Court then specifically noted that, although "these remarks
were made in regard to questions of monopoly, . . . they well describe the rights
which are covered by the word 'liberty,' as contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment."I 28
The Court then used the Allgeyer analysis in perhaps one of its mostfamous and most-criticized cases of all time: Lochner v. New York.129 In Lochner, the Court was asked to analyze the constitutionality of a statute limiting the
work hours legally allowed to constitute a work day.13 0 The Court expressly
found that such a statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which provides a "general right to make a contract in relation to
his business .

. .

."'

Importantly, the Court clarified the applicability of the

federal Constitution and noted that "[i]f the contract be one which the State, in
the legitimate exercise of its police power, has the right to prohibit, it is not prevented from prohibiting it by the Fourteenth Amendment."' 32 Nonetheless, the
Court believed that "the limit of the police power has been reached and passed
in this case." 33
Not all members of the Court agreed with Lochner's notorious use of
economic substantive due process; in fact, the famous dissents of Justice
Holmes, and Justices Harlan, White, and Day all foreshadowed the end of economic substantive due process, even from its inception. In Justice Holmes's
dissent, he cited numerous examples of legal, constitutional interferences with
freedom of contract. 134 Moreover, Holmes explained that "a constitution is not
intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and
the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez fair."'3 5 Most strongly, Holmes condemned the majority's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's reference to "liberty," stating that
125

See id.

Id. at 589-90.
Id. at 590 (quoting Butcher's Union Slaughterhouse Co. v. Crescent City Life-Stock Landing Co., 111 U.S. 746, 764 (1884) (Bradley, J., concurring)).
126
127

128

Id

129

198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
Id. at 52-53.

130

131

Id. at 53.

132

Id

13n

Id. at 58.

'
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74 (The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not
interfere with the liberty of others to do the same ... is interfered with ... whether he likes it or

not."). Id at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
13

Id.
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the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted
when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant
opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.136
Justices Harlan, White, and Day, on the other hand, took a more moderate approach to criticizing Lochner. Those Justices worked from the principle
that even if a freedom of contract existed, it "may, within certain limits, be subjected to regulations designed and calculated to promote the general welfare or
to guard the public health, the public morals or the public safety." 37 Although
the two dissents criticize Lochner's opinion from vastly different angles, both
nonetheless underscore the reasoning behind Lochner's eventual downfall.
ii.

Due Process and Commerce: Entwining to Provide Broad Constitutional Powers After Economic Substantive Due Process

After Lochner, the Court began in a limited fashion to consider and employ Justices Harlan's, White's, and Day's very criticisms of Lochner by evaluating regulations according to their effect on the general welfare, public
health, morals, or public safety.' 38 However, "[t]he economic crisis caused by
the Depression made the Supreme Court's hostility to economic regulation and
39
its commitment to laissez-faire economy seem anachronistic and harmful."
Interestingly, this sounds quite a bit like the present economic climate, in which
Wall Street's recent meltdown and a catastrophic recession have left the legisla-

136
Id. at 76. Holmes does exempt situations in which a rational man would admit that a regulation infringes on "fundamental principles," but he fails to explain what those may be. Simply,
Holmes does not believe freedom of contract is a fundamental principle worthy of protecting from
regulation, in part because it has already been heavily regulated.
'
Id. at 67 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
138 Id. See Nebia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (finding constitutional regulations fixing
the price of milk because regular methods of supply and demand failed to regulate such that consumers could regularly procure milk); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (upholding the
constitutionality of a law limiting the hours constituting a legal work day for all persons engaged
in manufacturing on grounds of exercising state police power over the health and safety of its
citizens); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 416-17 n. 1(1908) (upholding the constitutionality of a
law limiting the hours constituting a legal working day for women in "any mechanical establishment, or factory, or laundry" on grounds of their "special physical organization"). But see Adkins
v. Children's Hospital of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled in part by West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (holding unconstitutional provisions for minimum wages); Weaver
v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926) (holding unconstitutional a law that prohibited the use
of shoddy and finding the law an improper exercise of the police power due to reasonable methods
of sterilization of the shoddy, thus eliminating a public health concern).
1
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 100, at 130. See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 399.
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ture, courts, and citizens backpedaling.140 Just as the present economy required
a swift response of some sort, 141 so too did late-1930s America require a change,
at least in the eyes of many, including the Supreme Court.
In 1937, America got the change many desired when Justice Owen Roberts changed his voting pattern and voted in favor of statutes that otherwise
would have interfered with freedom of contract. 42 In West Coast Hotel Co. v.
43
Parrish,1
the Court re-examined its holding in Adkins v. Children'sHospitalof
the District of Columbia'" and overturned the long-held freedom of contract
principle.145 The Court recognized the limitations upon a freedom of contract,
or contract liberty, as articulated in the Lochner dissents and in Adkins.146
Moreover, in deciding the constitutionality of Washington state's minimum
wage laws, the Court discussed the inequity between employers and laborers.147
The Court articulated its new standard, explaining that "[1]iberty implies the
absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and
prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community." 4 8 Under this standard,
the Court concluded that inequity led laborers to engage in practices unsafe and
against the general welfare;14 9 thus, regulating such matters through a minimum
wage was reasonable and constitutional.
As of January 31, 2010, the special inspector charged with overseeing the TARP program,
Neil Barofsky, "said that the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, has failed to boost bank
lending as well as halt the spread of foreclosures - two key aims of the sprawling program."
David Ellis, Bailout coup:
TARP's not working, CNNMONEY.COM (Jan. 31, 2010),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/01/31/news/companies/tarpreport/index.htm (last visited Mar. 8,
140

2011).
See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 28.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 100, at 541. Professor Chemerinsky suspects that perhaps Justice
Roberts's switch was due to President Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. Id.
143
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
141

142

'4

261 U.S. 525 (1923).

145

West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 390.

'"

Id. at 390, 395.

Id. at 393-94.
Id. at 392 (citing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567
(1911).
149
Interestingly, the Court noted:
147
148

There is an additional and compelling consideration which recent economic
experience has brought into a strong light. The exploitation of a class of
workers who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining power and
are thus relatively defenceless against the denial of a living wage is not only
detrimental to their health and well being but casts a direct burden for their
support upon the community. What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers
are calledupon to pay.
Id. at 399 (emphasis added). Although the Court retains the language of economic substantive
due process, such as its concern for the "general welfare," the Court has nonetheless shifted its
reasoning back to a concern for effects upon a community's economy.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss3/8

20

Patterson: Protecting Your Rights, But Not Your Paycheck: How Executive Comp

2011]

PROTECTING YOUR RIGHTS, BUT NOT YOUR PAYCHECK

951

One year later, in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,so the Supreme Court affirmed its new policy and constitutional interpretation' 5 ' and
refined its standard of review, although it did not shift its commerce inquiry
away from due process considerations.152 The Court was asked to consider
whether Congress's "Filled Milk Act," which "prohibit[ed] the shipment in interstate commerce of skimmed milk compounded with any fat or oil other than
milk fat, so as to resemble milk or cream, . . . infringes the Fifth Amend-

ment."
that:

53

The Court, for the first time, clearly and unequivocally pronounced

54

the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to
be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional
unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption
that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators. 55
In other words, the Court gave substantial deference to the legislature. 156In
fact, "[a]ny conceivable purpose is sufficient. The law only need seem to be a
reasonable way of attaining the end; it did not need to be narrowly tailored to
achieving the goal."' 5 7
Lochner then officially died in 1963, when the Court, in Ferguson v.
Skrupa,158 expressly overruled the case and emphasized the Kansas legislature,
and not the Court, as the appropriate mode of evaluating the Kansas legislation's
wisdom.' 59 In the Court's opinion, Justice Black wrote that "We have returned
It is important to recognize that the Court could not have used the Commerce Clause to supply its
rationale in West Coast Hotel Co. because the case dealt entirely with a state issue; the case
presents no evidence that the "community" to which the Court referred was any other than the
state of Washington.
1so
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
151
See id.
152
Id at 152.
Id at 145-46.
And qualified in its famous footnote 4.
155
CaroleneProducts Co., 304 U.S. at 152. This sentence precedes footnote 4, which famously limits the scope of things to which a rational basis test might not apply. Id. at 152 n.4.
156
See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (finding constitutional, as rationally related, a law making it "unlawful for any person not a licensed optometrist or
ophthalmologist to fit lenses to a face or to duplicate or replace into frames lenses or other optical
appliances...").
15
Id
158
372 U.S. 726 (1997).
'5

154

9

Id. at 729 ("Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is up to legisla-
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to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social
and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to
pass laws."160 In fact, Justice Black noted that "[l]egislative bodies have broad
scope to experiment with economic problems . . . .'"' As such, the Lochner era
of economic substantive due process came to a close.16 2
Today, the deference attributed to the legislature in Ferguson under a
due process analysis remains sound.16 3 Although a similar analysis could conceivably occur under the Fifth Amendment's due process clause in the case of a
federal regulation, modem complaints against federal legislation have occurred
under the Commerce Clause, which has reappeared since its sidelining during
the Lochner era.16
One such Commerce Clause complaint did arise in United States v. Lo65
pez,' and, though a rare incident, the Supreme Court found that the legislature
had overstepped its broad Commerce Clause discretion. In Lopez, the Supreme
Court found that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, in which Congress
made possessing a firearm in a school zone a federal offense, was an unconstitutional exercise of the Commerce Clause power because "[t]he Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be
connected in any way to interstate commerce."16 6 Congress argued that gun
control in school zones affected commerce by reducing violent crime that affects the national economy, by reducing national insurance expenses, and by
increasing students' willingness to attend school.'6 7 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, "conclude[d], consistent with the great weight of [its]
case law, that the proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce." 6 8
However, Justice Kennedy's concurrence, in which Justice O'Connor
joined, more accurately reflects the level of deference to which the Court has
paid Congress's Commerce Clause powers. Justice Kennedy explains that "the
federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays
too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when
1

Id. at 730.

161

Id.

See id.
See Cornwell v. California Bd. of Barbering and Cosmetology, 962 F. Supp. 1260, 1271-72
(S.D. Cal. 1997). Under a rational basis review, "[t]he burden is on the party challenging the
regulation 'to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way."' Id. at
1271 (quoting Usery v. Tucker Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)). Then, "[t]he regulation may only be struck down if there is no rational connection between the challenged statute and
a legitimate government objective." Id. at 1272 (citing Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488).
'
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
165
Id.
162
163

'"
167
16s

Id.
Id. at 563--64.
Id. at 559.
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one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too far."169 Unlike
the complete deference approach to any measure plausibly related to commerce,
which Justice Souter's dissent champions,170 Justice Kennedy endorses a rational basis standard as long as it maintains the delicate balance of power between
the federal branches."' Consequently, due to "the absence of structural mechanisms to require those officials to undertake this principled task, and the
momentary political convenience often attendant upon their failure to do so,"
Justice Kennedy argues against fully abdicating the Court's role with respect to
Congress's application of the Commerce Clause.17 2 In Lopez, Congress's justification was altogether too attenuated to commerce to be a rational basis to
which the Court could defer. 73
In United States v. Morrison, the Court further clarified its rational basis
standards under the Commerce Clause by distinguishing between economic and
non-economic activity.174 In Morrison, the Court clearly identified that Commerce Clause legislation must be related to an economic activity in order to survive a rational basis analysis.'7 5 Because the legislation at issue statutorily provided victims of gender-motivated violence a federal civil remedy, which is by
all rights a non-economic purpose, the Court found that Congress had surpassed
its authority under the Commerce Clause. 7 6 Interestingly, the rational basis
standard that Justice Kennedy would have employed in Lopez and which the
Court did employ in Morrison looks and functions much like the rational basis
standard that would apply under a Fifth Amendment due process clause analysis. As such, the only distinguishing factor between the two could, at times, be
the clause at issue as articulated in the Supreme Court opinion for a case. Thus,
because a modem commerce clause analysis and Fifth Amendment due process
analysis related to commerce would be quite difficult to distinguish, it is becomes much easier to understand just how the topic of federal economic regulation's constitutionality has become so confused.
169
170

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 604 (Souter, J., dissenting).

171 Id. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
172

Id.

1
174

Id. at 567-68.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 606-10 (2000).

175

Id.

Id. Since Morrison, two cases, United States v. Jones, 529 U.S. 848 (2000), and Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001),
have raised possible issues of Congress overstepping its Commerce Clause bounds. Most recently, the Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act of 2010 has come under fire as perhaps
straying too far from Commerce to be constitutional. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of
Health and Human Serv., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011)
(holding that Congress may not regulate inactivity under the Commerce Clause and thus, regulating individuals' failure to act, e.g. purchase insurance, exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause
authority).
176
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The Modem Commerce Clause as a Constitutional Means of
Regulating Executive Compensation

With an overview of the attenuated histories of commerce regulation in
mind, it is now time to come full circle to a better understanding of Napolitano's17 and Franck's' 78 divergent beliefs about the constitutionality of executive
compensation regulation. Franck correctly criticized the soundness of Napolitano's argument, which suggested that the Constitution provides a freedom of
contract that protects executives' compensation from regulation. Economic
substantive due process, which would have supported Napolitano's theory, is
not only dead,'79 but it also left a damning trail of evidence condemning Napolitano's theory. In an effort to illustrate the absurdity of a minimum wage law as
an overreaching of the police power, Justice Sutherland in Adkins argued that
if, in the interest of the public welfare, the police power may be
invoked to justify the fixing of a minimum wage, it may, when
the public welfare is thought to require it, be invoked to justify a
maximum wage. The power to fix high wages connotes, by like
course of reasoning, the power to fix low wages.' 80
The very outdated logic of economic substantive due process that Napolitano
sought to embrace-and that Franck criticized-supports the logic that would
permit the regulation or capping of executive compensation, since minimum
wages have long been constitutional.' 8 '
Moreover, under a strict Commerce Clause inquiry, the Court has acknowledged, since its 1937 decision in West Coast Hotel, the legislature's right
to regulate contracts, as long as the regulation is rational.18 2 Unfortunately for
Napolitano's argument, the odds are against him that the Supreme Court would
find regulating or capping executive compensation an irrational exercise of
Congress's Commerce Clause authority, since only a handful of legislative acts
post-1937 have been declared as such. 83 Nonetheless, the question remains as
to whether or not regulating executive compensation constitutes a rational application of Congress's Commerce Clause powers.

Napolitano, supra note 64.
Franck, supra note 106.
"7 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1997).
180
Adkins v. Children's Hospital of the District of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525, 561 (1923).
181
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 393-94 (1937).
182
See id. at 390; United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
183
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1949) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) are the best known as two rare exceptions of Congress overstepping its Commerce Clause
authority.
1"

178
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An inquiry into the rationality of Congressional regulation of executive
compensation under the Commerce Clause must begin with a determination of
whether executive compensation fits within the scope of Congress's Commerce
Clause powers. Broadly, the Courts have interpreted Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce to extend to its channels, instrumentalities, and other
activities substantially affecting interstate commerce. 8 4 Executive compensation is clearly not a channel of commerce. An instrumentality of commerce is a
thing or person in commerce.185 Consequently, it is illogical to consider executive compensation an instrumentality of commerce. Thus, if executive compensation is to fall within the scope of the Commerce Clause, it must be an activity
substantially affectingl 8 6 commerce.
Whether or not executive compensation is an activity that substantially
affects commerce is a determination ultimately reserved for the Court.187 However, the legislature will first make its own determination; if the law is not challenged, then even a law with which the Court may disagree will nonetheless
remain in effect. Under the Dodd-Frank Act's executive compensation provisions,'as the legislature is likely to find and subsequently convince the Court, if
necessary, that the proposed regulations for executive compensation are in fact
rationally related to Congress's goal of preventing conduct that could lead to
another bailout or threaten the stability of the American economy.' 89 Because
the Act prohibits only "excessive compensation"' 90 or compensation threatening
a "material financial loss"' 9' to a covered financial institution, the Act specifically targets only that conduct that history has shown to threaten the national
market economy.19 2 Interestingly, although one's first impulse may be to object
to the vagueness of "material financial loss,",193 commerce is so broadly interpreted today under the third prong' 9 4 that a concern for the national economy
would surely suffice.
Additionally, Congress's regulatory measures need not work, per se, to
achieve its given goal; rather, they must just be rationally related. 9 5 Conse'

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.

185

Id. at 558.

181

Id. at 559.

"8 Id. at 558 n.2 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., Inc., 452
U.S. 264, 311 (1981)).
188
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1899.
189 Id. § 95 1.
"o Id. § 956(a)(1)(A).
Id. § 956(a)(1)(B).
192 See infra Part II.
1" Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1899, § 956(a)(1)(B).
Commerce can be anything that substantially affects interstate commerce. United States v.
194
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1949).
''

195

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 100, at 545.
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quently, the financial collapse of 2008-2009 would likely be sufficient evidence
of the dangers that failing banks and corporations pose to the national economy.
The near-collapse of industry giants like AIG, Citigroup, and Bank of America,196 jeopardized thousands of jobs 9 7 and led to a spiraling collapse in the financial sector. If, as the Dodd-Frank Act implies,'98 certain types of executive
compensation did lead to the crisis, then Congress's purpose in regulating those
"risky" types of compensation is rationally based.
Moreover, although Lopez and Morrison restrict Congress's use of the
Commerce Clause, it is unlikely that the Court would similarly restrict Congress's authority to regulate financial institutions under the Dodd-Frank Act. It
is apparent that Congress must stray considerably far-afield in construing activities that affect commerce in order for the Court to rein it in. Even the recent
district court ruling in Floridav. U.S. Departmentof Health and Human Services,19 9 which held that Congress exceeded its authority by regulating inactivity,
namely individuals' failure to purchase health insurance, is inapplicable to the
Dodd-Frank Act's executive compensation provisions. Unlike in Floridaex rel.
Bondi, in which the district court held that inactivity could not be regulated under the Commerce Clause,2 00 the Dodd-Frank Act would likely fall within Congress's Commerce Clause power because it regulates financial institutions' methods for and means of awarding executive compensation-both active behaviors that, as argued above, could be construed as activities impacting interstate
commerce.
Although the executive compensation regulations as articulated in the
Dodd-Frank Act 20 1 may be constitutional under Congress's Commerce Clause
powers, it is less clear that future executive compensation regulation in the form
of compensation caps for executive pay would meet the rational basis test required. The Act specifically targets compensation schemes
that the regulators determine encourages inappropriate risks by
covered financial institutions (1) by providing an executive officer, employee, director, or principal shareholder of the covered
financial institution with excessive compensation, fees, or benefits; or (2) that could lead to material financial loss to the cov202
ered financial institution.
196

Ellis, supra note 55.

19
Impact
of
the
Financial
Crisis
on
Employment,
WORLD
BANK,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITEIEXTERNALINEWS/0,,contentMDK:21039894-menuPK:344
80-pagePK: 116743-piPK:36693-theSitePK:4607,00.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
198 See generally Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1899,
subtitle E.
'" No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).
200 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
201
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1899.
202
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1899, § 956(b)(1)-(2).
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The Act further prescribes that regulators should evaluate compensation under
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. 203 Therefore, determinations are not quite
arbitrary. However, in order for Congress to impose a cap on executive compensation, Congress would likely need to convince the Court that the capping
figure is not arbitrary. 204 Effectively, there must be some rational basis for the
capped compensation amount.
c.

The Contracts Clause: A (Mostly) False Obstacle to Constitutional
Regulation ofExecutive Compensation

Just as regulating executive compensation is likely to be constitutional
under Congress's Commerce Clause powers, it will also comply with limitations
imposed on Congress through the Contracts Clause of the Constitution,20 5 as
conceived in the Dodd-Frank Act. The Contracts Clause provides that "[n]o
State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts .... 2 06 Those who, in the wake of the government
bailout and proposed caps 20 7 on executive pay, became outraged and insisted,
through user comments and blog posting across the internet, 208 that the Contracts Clause would prohibit such measures, were somewhat misguided. They
may be right-but only in a limited fashion with respect to State regulation.
Otherwise, the Due Process Clause would govern the federal government's interference with existing compensation contracts.
Under the traditional analysis, the Contracts Clause only prohibits
States, and not the federal government, from interfering with contracts.2 09 If the
federal government interferes with existing or future contracts, then the Due
Process Clause applies. 2 10 The Due Process Clause 2 1 1 of the Fifth Amendment
Id. § 956(c)(1)-(2) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1831 p.1, 9).
"Even though the boundary between commerce and other matters may ignore 'economic
reality' and thus seem arbitrary or artificial to some, we must nevertheless respect a constitutional
line that does not grant Congress power over all that substantially affects interstate commerce."
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 593 (1949) (Thomas, J., concurring).
205
H.R. 3269 (as introduced to the House, July 21, 2009).
206
U.s. CONST. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added).
207
Not officially proposed, but widely discussed and supported.
208
See, e.g., Owen Cameal, User Comment.
Boortz.
(Feb. 4, 2009),
http://boortz.com/nealznuze/2009/02/ limiting-executive-pay.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2011)
(blog of nationally syndicated Neal Boortz Show discussing executive pay limitations).
209
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; see Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 458 (1991) (Kennedy, J.
dissenting) (emphasizing a limitation on State impairment of contracts).
210
See Norman v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 307-08 (1935) (affirming that
"[c]ontracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority of the Congress" and that
"[p]arties cannot remove their transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional power by
making contracts about them") (holding as constitutional a joint resolution from Congress that
prohibited "gold clauses," which required payment in gold or currency equivalent to gold, on
grounds that they violated public policy).
203

204
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to the Constitution is subject to a rational basis review similar to that undertaken
individually or in conjunction with the Commerce Clause when applied to economic activity. 2 12 Consequently, because the Dodd-Frank Act is economic in
purpose, the federal government can meet a rational basis standard with respect
to future compensation regulations. Additionally, most future regulations-that
is, if the government could rationalize a particular level of restriction-such as
salary caps or additional federal regulation of executive compensation-would
not violate the Contracts Clause.
Now, if the states were to regulate executive compensation, then the
Contracts Clause might present a constitutional problem.213 Importantly, the
Contracts Clause only limits state or local governments from interfering with
already-existing contracts; 2 14 it has no control over States' interference with
future contracts. 2 15 Therefore, only existing executive compensation contracts
would be at issue. States could very likely determine or create laws defining the
maximum duration of any executive compensation contract and then establish
caps that would take effect well beyond the threshold for those contracts. Alternatively, states could grandfather existing contracts but subject all renewals to
new regulations. In this way, very few contracts would give rise to disputes
under the Contract Clause.
Even those disputes that would arise would not necessarily win on a
constitutional challenge under a straight Contracts Clause analysis. In Energy
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., the Court set forth the test

for determining whether or not the government interfered with private216 contracts so as to constitute a violation of the Contracts Clause. 2 17 That test looks to
whether the state interfered with an existing contract; total impairment is not
required.2 18 The Court noted, however, that "state regulation that restricts a parU.S. CONST. amend. V.
212
See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (providing the
foundation for the various standards of review under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment). Interestingly, when the United States is party to a contract it wishes to invalidate,
though, a stricter level of scrutiny obtains. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 897-98
(1996).
213
U.S. CONST. art. I, §10.
214
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827) ("The States can pass no law impairing contracts;
that is, any contract. In the nature of things a law may impair a future contract, and therefore,
such contract is within the protection of the constitution."). Id. at 250-51.
215
See Norman, 294 U.S. at 307-09.
216
As opposed to public contracts, which are subject to a different test. See
CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 100, at 562.
217
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
218
Id. (citing U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1977)).
Interestingly,
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, modifies the Constitution's use of the word "impairment" with the word "substantial," although the reason for doing so is not apparent. Professor
McLaughlin suggests that such modification is both unnecessary and against the written text and
common interpretation of the Constitution. James A. McLaughlin, Majoritarian Theft in the
211

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss3/8

28

Patterson: Protecting Your Rights, But Not Your Paycheck: How Executive Comp
2011]

PROTECTING YOUR RIGHTS, BUT NOT YOUR PAYCHECK

959

ty to gains it reasonablyexpected from the contract does not necessarily constitute a[n] ... impairment." 2 19

In Kansas Power & Light Co., the Court held that Kansas had not violated the Contracts Clause because its regulatory changes to an existing public
utility contract were contemplated by the parties and did not "substantially impair" the contractual relationship.220 Moreover, the parties acknowledged the
highly regulated nature of their dealings. 2 2 ' The Court determined that even if
Kansas had impaired the contract relationship, its conduct was a well-justified
exercise of its police power in providing stability in utility prices and supplies.22 2
In the context of regulating executive compensation, a court would follow the same three-step inquiry found in Kansas Power & Light: did the state
impair a contract between an executive and his or her employer; if so, did the
state have a significant and legitimate reason for doing so; and finally, is the
interference proportional to the public benefit? 2 2 3 Under the "threshold inquiry"
set forth in United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey,2 24 only those
regulations seeking to abrogate an executive's expected gains might qualify as a
violation of the Contracts Clause. 22 5 For example, in Kansas Power & Light,
Co., the Court found that the public utility company's indefinite contract had not
contemplated or bargained for a deregulated market, in which prices would have
been considerably lower.226 Similarly, if a state were to regulate so as to freeze
executive compensation at its present level and prevent further adjustments after
the legislation's effective date, such regulation is unlikely to run afoul of the
Contracts Clause because the affected executives would not have "reasonably
expected" 227 those possible, un-bargained-for future earnings. However, if a
state were to regulate against executives receiving all bonuses for the fiscal year
in which the legislation would become effective, including those to which executives would be entitled by contract, then a state would most likely be guilty
of interfering with the contractual relationship.

Regulatory State: What's a Takings Clausefor?, 19 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 161,
169 n.23 (1994-95).
219
Kansas Power& Light Co., 459 U.S. at 411 (citing US. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 31) (emphasis added).
220

Id. at 416.

221

Id. at 415-17.

22

Id. at 416-19.

223

Id. at 410-12.

Id. at 411 (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978)).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
226
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 414-16 (1983).
227 See Kansas Power & Light Co., 549 U.S. at 411 (citing U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 31 (1977)).
224

225
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If a court finds that a state has interfered in a contractual relationship, it
must next analyze the interference under the second step of the private contract
analysis under the Contracts Clause. "If the state regulation constitutes a[n] ...
impairment, the State, in justification, must have a significant and legitimate
public purpose behind the regulation,2 28 such as the remedying of a broad and
general social or economic problem."2 Importantly, the Court has concluded
that such social or economic problems need not be temporary or in response to
an emergency.23 0
Under the second part of the private contract test under the Contracts
Clause, challenges to regulations for executive compensation would struggle.
Just as before with the Commerce Clause, the state would effectively need to
show a rational basis between the regulation 2 3 '-in other words, the exercise of
its police power-and the social or economic problem it seeks to remedy. At
first glance, one might think that if the federal government could prevail in relating regulations for executive compensation to preventing future financial
crises as those triggering the need for a bailout, then surely the states could prevail on such an argument as well.
Although perhaps this is true, states would likely find little trouble in
making a far simpler argument, at least if Congress would separately succeed in
legislatively finding a correlation between compensation schemes and risk encouragement. Despite their federal funding, states shoulder the burden of unemployment compensation administration and thus, higher unemployment imposes a higher burden on the States. 23 2 If risk-inducing executive compensation
packages create financial instability such as to jeopardize jobs, and in turn
states' unemployment rates, states certainly have a rational basis, if not a compelling interest in regulating executive compensation. Consequently, state regulations on executive compensation will likely pass the second part of the private
contracts test under the Contracts Clause.
Finally, the third step of the inquiry in determining whether or not a
state has violated the Contracts Clause by interfering with a private contract
looks at the proportionality between the interference and the public benefit. 233
At this final stage in the inquiry, the Court determines "whether the adjustment
of 'the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties [is based] upon reasonable conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying
Id. at 411-12 (citing U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 22).
229
Id. at 412 (citing Allied StructuralSteel Co., 438 U.S. at 247).
230
Id. at 412 (citing U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 22 n.19; Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 39-40 (1940)).
231
See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (explaining that rational
basis review requires only a showing that the legislature has not acted arbitrarily or irrationally).
232
UNITED STATEs DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS,
http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uifactsheet.asp (last updated Jan. 13, 2010).
233
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1983).
228
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[the legislation's] adoption."' 2 3 4 If the state is not a party to the contract, 235 then
.. . courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure."236
The third step for determining whether a state's laws violate the Contracts Clause with respect to private contracts almost ensures that regulations
surviving until this step survive entirely. This is because, as long as the government is not a party to the contract, 237 the Court will defer to the legislature
with respect to "necessity and reasonableness." 2 38 Effectively, the legislature
receives a high level of deference under the Contracts Clause, just as it does
under the Commerce Clause.239
Consequently, if a state's legislature has already determined that regulating executive compensation is necessary and reasonable to reduce the risk of
companies' future insolvencies, in turn preventing job loss and economic instability, then a court is very likely to accept such determinations and uphold
them. 24 0 Thus, if a state has passed the second part of the test for determining
the Constitutionality of contractual interference with private executive compensation contracts under the Contracts Clause, it is very likely that it will also pass
the third and final test and the Court will find it a constitutional exercise of its
police power.
Although future executive compensation regulation by states, and not
the federal government, could pose some Contracts Clause problems under a
traditional analysis to existing compensation contract, that is not to say that the
federal government would have no difficulty passing constitutional muster by
interfering with such existing contracts. Rather, due process, 241 and not the
Contracts Clause, would apply. Although it never passed, the Corporate and
Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009242 would have been
susceptible to scrutiny for its limitation prohibiting "recovery of incentive-based
compensation under compensation arrangements in effect on the date of enactment of this Act, provided such compensation agreements are for a period of no
Id. (citing U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,22 (1977)).
See id. (A different standard of legislative review applies when the State is a party to the
contract).
236
Idat 412-13 (quoting U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 22-23).
237
See id. In most cases involving executive compensation regulation, the government would
not be a party to the contract.
238
Id
239
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
240
Since Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Court has feared wielding the power of
the judiciary to make policy, which it believes is the legislature's job under the separation of powers. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
241
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (Under the Fifth Amendment,
"[1]iberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and
it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental objective").
242
H.R. 3269, 111th Cong. (2009) (as reported to the Senate, Aug. 3, 2009).
234
235
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more than 24 months." 2 4 3 In other words, recovery would have been permissible for those compensation contracts extending beyond a twenty-four month
period. This would have undoubtedly been federal interference with an existing
contract, to which a procedural due process analysis, rather than a traditional
Contracts Clause analysis, would apply.
Specifically, a procedural due process analysis under the Fifth Amendment would have been necessary because under the Corporate and Financial
Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, the federal government's prohibitions would have interfered with existing contract obligations. 2 " Each affected individual's case would have had to pass separately through the analysis.
Procedural due process analysis would have been appropriate because the complaining individual's property rights, namely contracted for compensation,
would have been at stake.245 Having identified the right at stake, then it would
have been easy to identify that the federal government, rather than a third party,
would have been responsible for the deprivation; Congress would have legislated the deprivation. Because the legislation would have passed without a judicial proceeding, a court would look to the interests of the affected party as opposed to the federal government's interests.2 46
Ultimately, a court would likely find that the individual's interest in retaining his or her contracted-for compensation outweighs the government's interest in moving forward its legislation, especially because, as evidenced by the
Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Act of 2009, the bill at one
time included a provision to expressly prohibit the very clawbackS247 that the
newest version permits against contracts not to be performed within twenty-four
months. Such evidence suggests that the proposed legislation 24 8 would have
violated due process because a viable alternative existed, namely prohibiting
clawbacks altogether. 24 9 Fortunately for Congress, the Dodd-Frank Act contains
no such clause.2 50

Id. § (4)(f).
Id. See Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499-500.
245
Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972) (discussing what constitutes a property right under due process analysis).
246
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (establishing that "[e]qual protection analysis
in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment"). See also
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (providing the foundation
for the various standards of review under the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment).
247
H.R. 3269, 111th Cong. (2009) § 2(b)(1) (as reported to the House, July 30, 2009).
248
Id. § 4(f) (as reported to the Senate, Aug. 3, 2009).
249
Id. § 2(b)(1) (as reported to the House, July 30, 2009).
250
See generally Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.
243

244
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The Takings Clause: RaisingMore Questions than Answers About Executive CompensationRegulation

d.

The final part of the Constitution that affords Congress the ability to regulate or limit Congress's actions with respect to the economy is the Takings
Clause. The Takings Clause of the Constitution, located in the Fifth Amendment, states that "private property [may not] be taken for public use, without
just compensation." 2 5 1 This is an important limitation on the federal and state
governments' powers to appropriate private property for government use. Traditionally, the Takings Clause has only applied to possessory or regulatory takings of real property.2 52 In the executive compensation context, the question
becomes: is an executive's knowledge the company's property or does it belong
to that executive, who is merely the company's agent? Napolitano's constitutional critique of regulating executive compensation suggests that the Takings
Clause, by virtue of merely referring to "private property,"2 53 should also extend
constitutional protections to some intellectual property not covered specifically
by, or in addition to, the Patent Act 54 or other already-existing protections. 2 55
The Dodd-Frank Act is not affected by this theory because it proposes
to regulate types of compensation, rather than amounts; 256 however, future caps
on executive compensation could implicate the Takings Clause, at least according to Napolitano.2 57 Napolitano argues that "[h]igh ranking executives are corporate assets with experience and knowledge unique to their employers' businesses."258 Moreover, he suggests that "by arbitrarily 25 9 reducing their salaries
U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469 (2005); San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005);
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nolan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825
(1987); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
253
U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
254
The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006).
255
See Napolitano, supra note 64; Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property and the Property

251

252

Rights

Movement,

REGULATION

(Fall

2007),

available

at

http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv30n3/v30n3-6.pdf. See also The Federalist Society for
Law and Public Policy Studies, Are Patents "Private Property" Under the Fifth Amendment?
(Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/publD.161/pubdetail.asp(select links to
download in audio or video formats).
256
H.R. 3269, 111th Cong. (2009) § 4 (as reported to the Senate, Aug. 3, 2009).
257
Napolitano, supra note 64.
258

Id

Although Napolitano suggests the caps would be arbitrary, the foregoing discussion of the
government's burden under a rational basis test suggests that the regulations would likely be less
259
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to serve the government's political needs, deflating their worth to their employers, incentivizing them to work less, or chasing them away, the government has
stripped these individuals of their personal value and of their value to employers
without just compensation." 2 60 Consequently, Napolitano suggests that such
"takings" violate the Fifth Amendment.261
Napolitano's theory is riddled with complex legal questions and hurdles. First, should one characterize executives' knowledge as a type of intellectual property or through an agency theory? In other words, is the executive's
knowledge property of the company or property of the person who acts as the
company's agent? The distinction is useful because two lines of thinking
emerge. If one characterizes the executive's knowledge via the former route,
one arrives back within the murky waters of intellectual property. If one characterizes the relationship via the latter theory, then one arrives in the world of
torts.262 Interesting tog
though the tort claim may be, it is the intellectual property
route that implicates the Constitution.
Thus, if one assumes that the relationship between the executive and his
or her employer263 is a property relationship, then one must evaluate whether it
could constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment if the regulation would so
deprive the corporation of its executive's services as to render a loss to the corporation. To date, courts have not spoken directly on this issue. However, even
if the Court were to find executive compensation regulations analogous to patent
law takings, which the Court discussed in Zoltek Corporationv. United States
(Zoltek 111),264 the Court would likely find such takings constitutional. To hold
otherwise would require the Court to conceive of executives' future earnings
either as property rights created by the government or to view executives' relationships with their companies as a kind of corporate property right.2 65
In Zoltek III, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
found that a patent holder could not sue the United States government for patent
infringement under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. In Zoltek III, a per
than arbitrary, in its common sense, in order for the government to succeed in passing the Commerce Clause and Contracts Clause hurdles of the Constitution.
260
Napolitano, supra note 64.
261
Id. See U.S. CONsT. amend V.
262
See Offshore Rental Co., Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1978) (conflict of laws
case acknowledging that dicta supported contention that corporation could sue in California for
the loss of a key employee's services under a master-servant theory).
263
Corporation, bank, or otherwise.
264
Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S.
(2007).
1113
265
The latter theory has numerous problems, discussed infra, not least of which is the nonlogical assertion that if executives' intellect is a corporate asset and the government caps those
executives' future earnings, then the government has "taken" the corporation's or business's asset.
The assertion follows logically if and only if one assumes that executives will not perform unless
they have indefinite upward mobility with respect to compensation. Arguably, this is not always
the case.
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curiam opinion, the Court cites Schillinger v. United States,266 in which "the
Supreme Court rejected an argument that a patentee could sue the government
for patent infringement as a Fifth Amendment taking under the Tucker Act. 26 7
Schillingerremains the law." 2 6 8
However, it is important to remember that Zoltek is a patent law case,
and patents are statutorily created property. As the Federal Circuit so aptly
noted in its opinion, "'[P]roperty interests are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules 26or9
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law."'
Patent laws are specifically created by the federal government, through Congress, 270 not the Constitution. 2 7 ' Thus, if the Court conceived of a corporation's
property interest in its executives as one not of patents or copyrights, but as a
category of property inherent in the definition of property, it is possible that
Zoltek would not persuade the Court on the issue of whether such executive
compensation regulations would constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 272
Another problem still exists, even if the Court would conceive of corporations' interests in executives as property rights existing outside of patent and
copyright laws; executives' value to corporations would not necessarily diminish due to decreased compensation. While some executives' might experience
diminished morale and lower productivity, perhaps due to searching for a new
job, others may agree with or simply accept the decreased compensation with a
"life happens" type of attitude. In other words, such a "taking" is unlike a possessory taking, where the "government confiscates or physically occupies property,273 because the government is not using or confiscating the executive's skill
or knowledge; those executives may continue to work for the companies, as
long as such a relationship is mutually beneficial. Similarly, although regulatory takings might facially fit the proposed problem at hand, which would result
through regulation, challenges to executive compensation regulation that would
rely on the Takings Clause will find that the Court's rule in Connolly v. Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation2 74 frustrates the application.
266
267
268
269

270

Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1350 (citing Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894)).
Id. (citingSchillinger, 155 U.S. at 169).
Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1352 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984)).
U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, para. 8.

271

Id
Such a foray into intellectual property law is well beyond the scope of this Note. Due to the
technicality of the subject and the constitutional focus of this Note, the purpose of this section is to
raise possible constitutional issues and identify all possible remedies without settling on the exact
definitions of property.
273
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 100, at 575.
274
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
272
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In Connolly, the Court stated that "the fact that legislation disregards or
destroys existing contractual rights does not always transform the regulation
into an unconstitutional taking." 275 The Connolly Court also set forth three
broad factors to consider in determining whether a regulation goes so far as to
become a taking. First, the Court must examine "the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant."27 6 Second, the Court must determine "the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations." 2 77 Finally, the Court looks to "the character of the governmental action."278
Although the Court prefers "ad hoc, factual inquiries into the circumstances of each particular case," 2 79 analyzing the above factors will nonetheless
yield the likely outcome-that executive compensation regulation is constitutional-if executive compensation regulation should come under a Takings
Clause challenge before the Supreme Court. First, the Court must examine "the
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant." 2 80 The claimant would be
the employer--corporation, bank, or otherwise-who believes the executive
compensation regulation has taken its executive's productivity. 281 After all,
Napolitano suggests that "[b]y arbitrarily reducing [high ranking executives']
salaries . . . deflating their worth to their employers, incentivizing them to work

less, or chasing them away, the government has stripped these individuals of
their personal value 2 82 and of their value to their employers. . . ."283 However,
there are a plethora of reasons that an employee might work less; ultimately, an
employee chooses to work less. Any executive whose salary has been capped or
otherwise regulated is free to remain at the corporation and work just as hard for
less compensation. Thus, the first factor is unpersuasive for finding an illegal
taking. Second, the Court must determine "the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations."284 Again, if caps
were imposed on corporations, executives would know their earning potential
Id. at 224 (citing Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 517 (1944); Omnia Commercial Co.
v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 508-10 (1923)).
276
Id. at 225 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124. Accord,
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. at 1005; PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S.
74, 82-83 (1980)).
277
Id
278
id
279
Id. at 224.
280
Id. at 225.
281
Napolitano, supra note 64 (emphasis added).
282
The executives' personal value is not in issue here; it is not entirely clear under what theory
Napolitano finds this value reduction unconstitutional.
283
Napolitano, supra note 64.
284
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986) (citing Penn Cent.
Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. Accord, Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005; PruneYard Shopping Ctr.,
447 U.S. at 82-83).
275
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regardless of where they worked, and executives whose compensation was
"maxed out" at one company could not find better compensation at another.
Thus, the executive who leaves has likely not been "chased away" 2 85 by the regulations, but instead left the company for other reasons.
286
Finally, the Court looks to "the character of the governmental action."
"[G]overnment regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically
viable use of property; government regulation is not a taking simply because it
decreases the value of a person's property, so long as it leaves reasonable economically viable uses." 28 7 Consequently, because the regulation does not maim,
kill, or disable the executive, it is likely the Court would characterize the government's regulation as a valid exercise of its police power that certainly leaves
"economically viable uses."288
Although Connolly is on its face a regulatory taking case under the Takings Clause, 28 9 in fact the Court has analyzed Connolly through the lens of substantive due process. 2 90 Rather than using a rational basis standard of review,
substantive due process employs a reasonableness test which "takes into account
the extent of the burden on the regulated party and requires that the public interest promoted be proportionate to that burden." 29 1 Although rough, Connolly, in
effect, has conducted a reasonableness test because it looks to the "character of
the government action" to consider whether the action leaves any economically
viable property uses.292 The analysis is rough, unfortunately, because the Supreme Court does not always clarify whether it is using substantive due process,
takings doctrine, or a combination of both.293 Nonetheless, it appears that the
Court, at least in part, relies not upon diminution of value theories alone, but
instead upon the reasonableness of those regulations.294 Therefore, a substantive
due process analysis would likely apply to the Dodd-Frank Ace 95 if challengers
could identify some legitimate property interest at stake.
See Napolitano,supra note 64.
286
Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 124. Accord, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. at 1005; PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-83 (1980)).
287
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 100, at 581.
285

288
289

Id. at 581.
U.S. CONsT. amend. V.

See McLaughlin, supra note 218, at 201.
Id. (citing TXO Prod. Co. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 459-60 (1993)).
292
Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225 (citations omitted).
293
McLaughlin, supra note 218, at 201. McLaughlin identifies Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183, 187-89 (1928), as a classic example of this problem, wherein the Court uses both
substantive due process and traditional takings doctrine to arrive at its conclusion. Id.
294
See TXO Production Corp., 509 U.S. at 459-60; Nectow, 277 U.S. at 187-89; Penn Cent.
Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 105 (discussing the relative benefits and burdens of airspace restrictions
above a historic landmark); McLaughlin, supra note 218, at 200-06.
290
291

295

Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.
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Although unlikely under the Dodd-Frank Act, the Executive Compensation Fairness Act of 2009 had implicated a property interest at far greater risk of
government taking than future earnings or a corporation's intellectual property:
the government's infringement on pre-existing contracts subject to recovery of
incentive-based compensation.2 96 Under the Executive Compensation Fairness
Act of 2009, Rep. Frank had proposed applying prohibitions to contracts not to
be performed within twenty-four months of the bill's enactment, had it
passed.297 Such infringement would likely have implicated a substantive due
process analysis: weighing the burdens and benefits of the regulatory "taking."
First and foremost, substantive due process analysis under the Fifth
Amendment is the same as under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 98 The applicable
standard is one of rational basis. 299 In United States v. Carlton, the Court discussed retroactive economic legislation and explained that the "burden is met
simply by showing that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative purpose."30 0 In a sense, the recovery on contracts
for compensation not to be performed within twenty-four months of the legislation's enactment3 o' would have been a retroactive law because it would have
applied a new law as though it existed when the compensation contract was
made. The rational justification undoubtedly proffered by the legislature was
actually contained in the bill: to prohibit "any incentive-based payment arrangement . .. that (1) could threaten the safety and soundness of covered financial institutions; or (2) could have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability."3 0 2 Consequently, it was unlikely that the government could have met and succeeded against substantive due process challenges
under the Takings Clause.303 Such difficulties may have been one reason that
the Dodd-Frank Act provides no similar retroactive application provision.
Altogether, challenges to future executive compensation regulation
measures brought under the Takings Clause would face a myriad of road-blocks.
The greatest would be whether there is even property at stake, generally, and if
H.R. 3269 § (4)(e) (as reported to the Senate, Aug. 3, 2009).
See id.
298
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976). See also United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (providing the foundation for the various standards of review under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
299
U.S. v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 30-31 (1994) (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A.
Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984)). The Court stated, "Provided that the retroactive application of a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means,
judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches ...
Id.
3oo
Id. (quoting PensionBenefit Guar. Corp., 467 U.S. at 729).
301
See H.R. 3269, 111th Cong. (2009) § 4(f) (as reported to the Senate, Aug. 3, 2009).
302
Id. § 4(b)(1-2).
303
Consequently, the better challenge should be brought under procedural due process as discussed in the section on Contracts.
296

297
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so, how to define it. Realistically, the only property at stake is alreadycontracted-for compensation, which is not at issue in the Dodd-Frank Act.
Moreover, even if it were at issue, the traditional analysis, rather than an intellectual property analysis would likely apply, since intellectual property rights
akin to copyrights and patents have not been traditionally covered by the Takings Clause.3 0 If the Court could identify a traditional property interest at stake,
then it still must determine whether legislation similar to that proposed in the
Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009 would
constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. This in turn would mean that
regulations would have to survive a substantive due process analysis with respect to takings under the recovery of incentive-based compensation.3 05 ultimately, if similar regulations affecting already-contracted-for compensation
ever passed, constitutional challenges to those regulations-and those alonewould perhaps be the only ones that succeed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Between the emotional response to the 2008-09 financial crisis and the
political twists applied by Democrats and Republicans alike, it is little wonder
that so many people are so very confused about what is happening, what might
happen, and whether those measures are constitutional. The Constitution is
complex, and though the words remain the same, the Court's interpretation of
the Constitution has changed throughout the years. Thus, it is little surprise that
even Napolitano, who spent several years on the New Jersey Superior Court
bench,306 would believe that the Constitution protects freedom of contract or
would support an intellectual property-based Takings Clause challenge to executive compensation regulations.307
After evaluating the Dodd-Frank Act,30 s as well as the possibility of often-discussed caps on executive pay, under the Taxing and Spending Clause, the
Commerce Clause, the Contracts Clause, and the Takings Clause, there is little
doubt that at least the executive compensation provisions of the Dodd-Frank are
constitutional. Although the constitutionality of future legislation would, of
course, depend on the language of each future bill, the concept of capping executive compensation-very much opposed by some and championed by others-presents the greatest Constitutional difficulty. Nonetheless, if the legislature could rationally impose caps so as to avoid issues of arbitrariness, such
compensation limitations would likely pass constitutional muster as well.
3
See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 551
U.S. 1113 (2007).
305
H.R. 3269, 111th Cong. (2009) § 4(f) (as reported to the Senate, Aug. 3, 2009).

3
307

308

Napolitano, supra note 64.
Id.
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1899.
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The Constitution affords very broad powers to Congress with respect to
the economy. In the economic arena, Congress must only face a rational basis
test when attempting to regulate nearly everything that touches and concerns the
channels, instrumentalities, and activities substantially affecting commerce. 309
Although many may rely on various aspects of the Constitution for protection
from laws they dislike, only one Constitutional right truly protects people's economic preferences: the power to vote for leaders committed to representing the
interests-whatever they may be-of those they serve.
Sarah B. Patterson*

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
Senior Editor, Volume 113 of the West Virginia Law Review; J.D. Candidate, West Virginia
University College of Law, 2011; B.A. in Comparative Literature and Philosophy, magna cum
laude, Hamilton College, 2008. The author would like to thank Professor James A. McLaughlin
for advising this Note, her colleagues on the West VirginiaLaw Review, and her friends and family for their patience and support.

3

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss3/8

40

